each client must possess a public key for each server or a secure channel to each server, with an n-fold cost k storage.
Finally, in cases in which a client must forward the (digitally signed) replies of the servers to other parties, as is the case, e.g., in many cryptographic protocols (see the "push" technique of Lampson et al. [1992] ), the client must store and forward 0(n) replies, instead of only one as if the service were not replicated.
In this article we propose a solution to these problems using a modification of state machine replication.
In its full generality, our approach can be used to implement a service with n servers so that clients accept responses computed by correct servers, and no other responses, provided that n > t + b where t is the maximum number of faulty servers, and b is the maximum number of these faulty servers that behave maliciously. A novel feature of our approach is that unlike "normal" state machine replication described above, each client possesses exactly one public key for the service (as opposed to one for each server) and can treat the service as a single object for the purposes of We henceforth use f to denote such a function.
The Protocol
Suppose that a public key (e, N) and corresponding shares {K,}l~,~~are created as above, with the threshold parameter k = b + 1,and distributed so that for all i, 1< i < n, the ith server s, is the sole possessor of K, and any process can reliably obtain (e, N), the public key of the service. We do not discuss methods for distributing this information, although we note that all public-key systems require similar steps. The (information for computing the) integers pt T for all i and T can be "hardwired" into the servers. Then, the respond' (c, 'm ) and accept'(m) routines are implemented as follows.
Routine respond' (c, m) at server s,:
(2) Wait until a set of messages {{ s~, ( f(m), a~))}~~T, ITI = k, has been received such that A~f~~,T = f(m)"~~. T( aj)P~,T mod N is a valid signa-
2Here we assume that messages can be received during the execution of respond'. Routine czccept'( m) at client c:
(1) If m is not of the form ((c, m', m" ), S ), then return to the calling routine.
(2) If accept(( c, m', m'")) for some m'" was previously executed at c, then return to the calling routine.
(3) If S is a valid signature for f'((c, m', m")) (i.e., if S' = f((c, m', m")) mod lV), then execute a,ccept(( c, m', m" )) and return to the calling routine only after it has completed. it follows that a correct client will accept a response for each of its requests. 
Discussion
In theory, the most computationally expensive part of this protocol is step 2 of the respond ' routine, in which the server sorts through the partial results it receives until it finds a T of size k such that A~( m), T is a valid signature. The performance of our prototype service is illustrated in part (a) of Figure   3 . The line indicates the mean response time in seconds as a function of n, the number of servers. For each n, we assumed that t = b = \(n -1)/2]. We have illustrated the curve for up to nine servers, although we expect that few services will be implemented by more than five, as mentioned in Section 4.3. In these tests the RSA modulus iV was 512 bits. These tests were executed between user processes over SunOS 4. at correct or honest servers only after m. As before, we will use deliuer to deliver a request in our implementation of deliver', and we will use request to issue a request in request'.
In the implementation of request'(m), the client c encrypts m under the public key of the service before issuing the request to the service. Then, c is 
The Protocol
Suppose that we are using the RSA threshold cryptosystem described above and that we have the initial conditions assumed in Section 4.2: the ith server s, is secretly given sole possession of K,; the cryptosystem threshold parameter k = b + 1; any process can reliably obtain the public key (e, IV) of the service; and all servers know (a priori) p,, T for all i and T. The basic idea of our protocol is that each client encrypts each of its requests m with the public key of the service, in an attempt to force k servers to cooperate to decrypt it. Then, each correct or honest server refrains from broadcasting its partial result for the ciphertext of m until the delivery sequence through m is fixed locally. In this way, once a corrupt server collects k partial results for the ciphertext of m, the delivery sequence through m is fixed at some correct (1) The corrupt server chooses an arbitrary x and computes y -x' mod N; i.e., x = yd mod N.
(2) Via a corrupt client, the corrupt server issues the request ym mod N to the service. (1) Generate a new, random seed q, O < q < N, and encrypt m as in Lim and Lee [1994] , i.e., where "o" denotes bitwise exclusive-or.
(2) Execute request((ml, m2, m~)).
Routine deliver'(m) at server s,:
(1) If m is not of the form (ml, m2, m~), then return to the calling routine.
(2) If (m~)e # (ml)f(~ll~2) mod N, then return to the calling routine (because this may be a chosen-ciphertext attack).
(3) If this is the hth execution of deliver', then execute bcast (( h, anl,, ) ), where cz~l,l -(ml)~z mod N is S,'S partial result for ml.
(4) Wait until a set of messages {( SJ, ( h, a~))}J.~, IT I = k, has been received such that A~l,~= ml .~j. T( a~)PJ, T mod N is the correct decryption of ml (i.e., such that (A~l,~)' -ml mod N). 
